Games the Government Plays: Federal Funding of Minority Economic Development by Hetzel, Otto J.
GAMES THE GOVERNMENT PLAYS:
FEDERAL FUNDING OF MINORITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
OTTo J. HETZE.*
INTRODUCTION AND GAME PLAN
Little control or ownership of wealth-generating resources in the United States
is in the hands of minority group members.' In an avowed attempt to increase par-
ticipation in the economic mainstream,' a number of federal government programs
have held out the hope of financial support for development of minority business
enterprises. These programs have included those administered by the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO),3 the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD), 4 the Department of Commerce,5 and the Small Business Administra-
tion (SBA).o In every instance, pronouncements of specific thrusts to develop inner-
city minority business have been widely heralded. Some programs have included
development efforts for rural areas as well, thereby assisting Indians and Mexican-
Americans. In each case, however, the "getting" has been far from easy, and the
"using" has been equally frustrating. This article will attempt to illustrate that the
government's administration of these programs often constitutes a series of "games"
imposed on those minority group members who attempt to utilize the financial
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'Industry distribution showed that most minority ownership was of retail businesses with personal
service businesses second. There was little minority ownership of construction and manufacturing concerns.
Nearly all of the minority businesses were situated in urban aieas. SmALL BusiNEss ADMINIsTRATION,
NATioNAL Suvy oF U.S. BusiNEss 1, 2 (5969). The "typical" minority businessman operates a one-man
personal service or retail shop in a central city area, and has annual gross receipts of $20,000 or less. The
comparable figure for other businesses is $5o,ooo. Only 3.25% of the nation's more than 5,000,000 small
businesses are owned by members of minority groups, although such members comprise x5% of the nation's
population. Hearings on the Economic Opportunity Amendments before the Subcomm. on Employment,
Manpower and Poverty of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 9st Cong., 1st Sess. 579
(2969) [hereinafter referred to as Economic Opportunity Hearings).
' The federal government has developed several thrusts to expand minority involvement in the SBA's
programs. Under the Johnson Administration these efforts were entitled "Project OWN." The Nixon
Administration renamed them "Operation Mainstream" to stamp them with its imprint. Dedicated as
these titles seem, it must be remembered that it is effectiveness-not titles-that provides progress.
OThe Office of Economic Opportunity distributed funds authorized under title I-D of the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2981 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2763-68 (Supp. V,
1970).
'HUD administers the Model Cities program, which is the colloquial name given the program au-
thorized under the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 2966, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-13
(Supp. V, 1970).
'The Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration manages the program au-
thorized under the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 312-26 (Supp.
V, 1970).
6 Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1964)-
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resources offered. A typical program may include some or all of the following games
initiated by the government and often involving various gambits, variations, and
other gamesmanship qualities which the government's bureaucracies have pains-
takingly, albeit unknowingly, constructed.
Initially the government begins the action with Come Play with Me, a game that
generally follows a consistent form. The government brings forth its development
program and through brochures, pamphlets, public speeches, personal sell, and other
similar techniques attempts to interest minority group members in playing-that is,
requesting financial support. Promises are made, expectations are planted, and
minority businessmen become eager to play.
Once the government has attracted the minority group member, it initiates a
second game, See if You Qualify. This is the first of a long series of frustrations for
the now recruited applicant as he attempts to successfully complete his quest.
Often See if You Qualify is a long game. The government makes it very diffi-
cult for a minority businessman to find out if he is eligible. Eligibility also
can be complicated if the goverment decides to impose Gotta Play with Those
Guys (even if they don't want to play with you). In Gotta Play with Those
Guys the minority businessman is forced to acquire a partner before he can
proceed. The partner may have to be a private lending institution, a local
government body, or both. The partner will, of course, extract a price for its
"cooperation." The game ends, along with any hope of federal aid, if the minority
businessman is not willing to or cannot acquire a partner. Another game that arises
in conjunction with See if You Qualify is Gotta Bring Your Own Ball (even if you
don't have one). Gotta Bring Your Own Ball requires that the minority businessman
acquire a certain amount of private capital before he can qualify for a loan or a grant
of federal money. If he fails to acquire that capital either on his own or from his
partner, the games are over and he loses.
Should the minority businessman be successful at See if You Qualify, the govern-
ment continues to play other games with him, although the tactics used can vary
depending upon the program involved. For instance, the government often imposes
Only One Game at a Time, thus prohibiting the player from participating in several
government programs simultaneously. While one government bureaucracy may ask
for multiple program involvement, another will invoke Only One Game at a Time.
This tactic forces the minority participant to choose only one program, and the
player then can use no other program's aid during the game.
Perhaps the most frequently imposed game is Change the Rules. This comes in
two segments: specific rules are set by the government7 and agreed upon by the
player; then, when the player begins to play under them, the government changes
the rules. Change the Rules can result in the players' needing to renegotiate totally
his relationships with government-imposed partners (often to his great detriment), to
' Rules can be set by statute, administrative regulations, policy issuances, guidelines, speeches, or
contract.
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change his internal organization, or to amend his business operation. If he refuses
to change, the practical result is often that he is prevented from participating further
in government programs.
Another favorite government game seems to be No Mistakes Allowed. The
player is allowed to play until he makes an error, whether major or minor. Some-
times it is better to make a major error, because no bureaucrat likes to admit he
approved of aid to an applicant who turned out to be a real "loser." After the error
the government often moves against the player in a concerted effort to drive him
out of the program.
No administration of a government program is complete unless it involves Rig
the. Game, with its many variations and gambits. Rig the Game occurs in three
forms. One involves use of time controls by the government. When a player falls
behind the imposed schedule and time runs out, the player loses. Government time
delays are also part of this ploy: it can delay action at certain stages of the program
for so long a period that the player is forced to quit the game and search else-
where for aid. In a second variation of Rig the Game, government aid is designed
so that no player has enough money at any time with which to succeed. Sooner
or later, he goes broke and loses the business. The government may also Rig the
Game by promising to supply managerial and technical assistance to its players. In
most cases this aid either is not given or is insufficient to impart the knowledge
necessary to make the business successful. Sometimes when the aid is effective, the
government "rewards" the initial success by using the tactic Withdraw the Aid or
by rendering it ineffective by other means.
The ultimate result of these games is to provide the government with an oppor-
tunity to play You Fail. In You Fail the player becomes so discouraged that the gov-
ernment assumes his role and closes off the program to him. Near the end of this game,
all player influence is eliminated. The government continues the program with other
applicants attracted by Come Play with Me-it seems to have an insatiable need
for fresh players. Conversely, it is axiomatic that every administrator must have a
program to administer.
During the development of the minority business the federal agency which has
imposed the games acts as referee. Its decisions are final and no protest is allowed
the player. Occasionally the player attempts to reverse roles and instigate a game
called Legal Review. This game, however, usually results in further losses for the
player, and little relief is obtained. There is usually an analogy here to "don't bite the
hand that feeds you." The condition of servitude thereby involved can be a bitter
pill to minorities using economic development to obtain their independence. Finally,
even "success" in Legal Review comes far too late for the player who is out of
business or, at the least, has lost control.
By attempting to work within the system, the minority businessman is required
to play the government's games. When the minority businessman ultimately loses,
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he naturally feels embittered toward the system. If major improvements are not
made in the government's attitude, and in its approaches to operation of its economic
development programs, the economic condition of minority groups will become even
more depressed. Traditional funding sources have not been adequate to give minority-
owned or controlled business an opportunity to establish itself. The government
must abandon its game playing, and take the initiative and the risks necessary
to fund new ventures. Its current dependence upon the use of private lending sources,
particularly as a way to escape taking risks, must be curtailed, for, in the area of
financing, it is simply impractical to expect the private sector, which must be profit-
oriented, to underwrite minority developmental effort' Significant public resources




SBA's version of Come Play with Me involves loan programs as well as technical
and managerial assistance. These programs have received special emphasis from the
last two administrations. Under the Johnson Administration SBA embarked upon
"Project OWN" which had as its goals "to insure free competition as the essence
of American economic system of private enterprise, and to strengthen the overall
economy of the Nation."9 The Nixon Administration renamed the program "Opera-
tion Business Mainstream" and announced that its goals were: (I) to stimulate small
business in deprived areas, (2) to promote minority enterprise opportunity, and (3)
to promote small business contribution to economic growth and competitive environ-
ment.10
Currently SBA offers small business financial and management assistance in the
form of lease guarantees," management assistance, 12 aid in obtaining government con-
tracts, 3 counseling services,' 4 and more than 8oo publications covering successful
practices in every small business field. SBA also expressly helps victims of disasters'5
' Even with guarantees, private sources must charge the costs-namely red tape-of doing business
with the government. Admittedly, direct loan programs involve a budgetary impact which guarantees
avoid. Nevertheless, in the end, direct government loans are less expensive and should be less complicated.
9 SMALL BusINEss ADMINISTRATION, SBA: WAT IT Is, WHAT IT DOES 2 (1970) [hereinafter referred
to as SBA: WHAT IT Is].
" SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SBA BUSINESS LOANS 2 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as SBA
BusImEss LOANS].
" SBA: WHxAT IT Is, supra note 9, at iI.
2 SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 2 (1968) [hereinafter
referred to as MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE]. Service Corps of Retired Executives
(SCORE), Counseling at the Local Level (CALL), and Active Corps of Executives (ACE) are the best
known management assistance programs provided by SBA.
aSMIuLL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, 8(a) CONTRACTING 2 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as 8(a)
CONTRACTING].
14 SBA: WHAT IT Is 24; MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, at 2.
" SBA: WHAT IT Is 8.
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and small business concerns which are displaced as a result of federally-aided con-
tructon programs.' 6
The strength of SBA's role in Come Play with Me lies in its various loan
programs. SBA can participate in, or guarantee, up to ninety per cent of a bank
loan and, in certain instances, can make a direct government loan.17 Through the
Economic Opportunity Loans (EOL) program, a loan of $25,ooo can be made to any
resident in an area aided by SBA' s who does not have adequate income to support
the basic needs of his family and has been denied adequate business financing through
normal lending channels.' SBA may also help finance small firms through privately-
owned small business investment companies (SBIC's) by a loan or by a guarantee
program. °
The SBA programs look very attractive to a minority businessman and he can
easily be persuaded to tackle the other games played by SBA. See if You Qualify is a
crucial game. To qualify, a business must be a "small business" 21 which, depending
upon its categorization,22 has sales of $i million to $15 million and 250 to 1,5oo em-
ployees.
Gotta Bring Your Own Ball is at the heart of all SBA programs. The applicant
must meet general credit requirements which include the following:
(i) Have adequate capital prior to the loan, so that with an SBA loan he can
operate on a sound financial basis;23
(2) Show that the past earnings record and future prospects of the firm indicate
the ability to repay the loan and other fixed obligations out of profits 4
Specific percentages of Tequired capital were dropped in X970 in favor of the more
vague standard of a "reasonable" amount of private equity.25 However, a reasonable
amount of private equity is usually Si for every $9 loaned for a local development
company (LDC)26 and can be as much as $x for every $5 loaned for other private
businesses.
1
, d. at Io.1 Id. at 4.
"I8 d. at 5, 6. The area of coverage is the United States, Puerto Rico, and Guam.
19 Id. at 6.
"Id. at 15, 16.
" A "small business" is defined as "one which is independently owned and operated and which is
not dominant in its field of operation." SBA BusINEss LoANs, supra note 1O, at 3. Gambling or speculative
firms, newspapers, and television and radio stations are not eligible for SBA aid. SBA: WAT IT IS, supra
note 9, at 2.
'
5 SBA: WHAT IT Is, supra note 9, at 2.
"SBA BusiNvss LoANs, supra note 10, at 4.
2& Id.
"This "reasonable" standard is applied to businesses owned by minority group members. SBA Na.
tional Directive 5Io-IA at 49 (Jan. 9, 197o) and app. 2o, at 245 (Feb. 2o, 1970).
" The extent of equity to be supplied by the LDC varies with the size of the town in which it
is located. A community with a population exceeding xo,ooo must contribute 20% of a project's cost in
addition to the private equity investment so the leverage is not nearly as great as the 9 to 1 ratio implies.
See, S As.L BusINEss ADMINISTRATION, 502 LOCAL DEvELOpMENT CO.MPANY PROoAaM 2 (1968), for other
LDC percentage involvement.
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SBA invoked Only One Game at a Time when it stipulated, by way of an un-
published directive, 7 that government cash grants could not be used to furnish
the required private share of the loans. Only One Game at a Time eliminates most
uses for HUD, Model Cities, and EDA money in SBA games and, in conjunction
with Gotta Bring Your Own Ball, has effectively prevented many minority business-
men from participating. This is true regardless of their personal ability, since eligibility
is measured by an applicant's existing financial resources. However, capital is
usually in short supply for development projects in inner city areas.28 The require-
ment, therefore, causes many applicants to be rejected without consideration of other
factors which may balance the lack of personal funds.
Even though there is no set amount of capital necessary for any certain amount
of loan, it is assumed that there must be "reasonable" personal capital invested.
There is no evidence that regional SBA directors have used this flexible standard
to make more money available to applicants. In fact, given SBA's past record, one
can expect that even more rigid standards may now be applied than were required
before the "reasonable" standard was promulgated.
SBA should adopt a policy which not only looks at the capital which persons
organizing the business have available, but, in addition, considers the type of
business and its chances for success in the field, the skill possessed in management
and technical capacities of the applicants, the personal ambition and self-pride of
the applicants, and the business contacts and other expected financing prospects
available if the business becomes viable. Here, again, SBA must be willing to take
risks.
SBA also requires Gotta Play with Those Guys by imposing the requirement
that a minority businessman include a private lending institution as a participant.
Most of these loans require bank participation, and direct government loans are
made only in a small number of cases where private support is not available.29
Thus, SBA requires that:
(i) the bank and SBA participate together on a loan with a maximum SBA
interest rate of 5zoA and maximum SBA participation not in excess of
$i5o,ooo on any loan (the bank's interest rate is not to exceed 8/ on the re-
maining amount of the loan);0 or
(2) the bank accept an SBA guarantee of 9O/o (or $35o,00o, whichever is less)
on a bank loan; interest is set by the bank.21
These programs often require SBA to adopt the lending practices of the bank
because it cannot function without bank cooperation. Even with a ninety per cent
guarantee many banks are hesitant to participate in SBA's minority loan program
" SBA National Directive 535-2 at 42.
"Note, Community Development Corporations, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1558, x635-36 (970).
a
9 SBA: WHAT IT Is, supra note 9, at 3-
'oId. at 4.
Slid. at 4.
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because of the perceived high risk32 and red tape involved. In the participation
program the bank is nearly as reluctant to loan money as it would be if it were the
only source of the loan, for if a bank will not lend money to an applicant on its
own, it usually is no more likely to do so even with SBA participation or backing.
Gotta Play with Those Guys puts the program in the hands of the private lenders,
who must agree to play with the minority businessman. Since such participation
is difficult to come by, this game effectively eliminates many applicants. Thus, the
minority businessmen who may need SBA most are excluded from the game, while
others, who already qualify for private funding, are accepted and can receive more
aid. This means SBA tends to help those businessmen who can help themselves,
while denying help to those who really need government aid. This operating
policy is in basic conflict with the philosophy Congress declared in creating SBA 3
The various versions of Rig the Game also seem very popular with SBA, and
delaying tactics occur frequently in its early stages. Before SBA will make a loan on
its own, the regional director must make a thorough investigation of the applicant's
qualifications. Time and effort on the part of the applicant and the SBA staff in
processing and completing a loan, however, is often excessive. It generally takes six
to eight months from the time the applicant first expresses the desire for a loan and
inquires about it to the time when the loan money is in his hand3 4 Even prior loan
recipients who later request more money run into delay problems. For an on-
going concern, or for someone who has expended his own money in expectation of
going into business, these delays can be disastrous.
SBA attempted to curtail its use of the Time Delay tactic by recourse to a
Simplified Blanket Loan Guarantee Plan (SBLG).3 5 Under this program, the bank
participating with the SBA prepares a simplified set of forms which become the
core of the report submitted to the regional director. This new program, however,
only disguises the Time Delay, for SBA measures time in a very singular way under
SBLG. Time does not start until SBA accepts an application; but the application
is not "accepted" until all of the forms are in order, so that the final report can be
written. On one SBLG loan traced through SBA, Time Delay was played as follows:
-December 29, I969-SBA receives letter and forms already completed by SBLG
bank.
-February ii, i97o-Letter of December 29, 1969 marked "received, February ii,
"
2 Interview with Ray Willis, former Controller of Citizens Urban Opportunity Fund of Detroit,
Michigan, in Detroit, Mar. 1, 1971.
"' "It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and
protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free com-
petitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts or sub-
contracts for property and services for the Government ... be placed with small-business enter-
prises .... ." 15 U.S.C. §63i(a) (x964).
"G. Britts, SBA Operation Mainstream: An Administrative Study 7, May 26, 1970 (unpublished
paper delivered to the Seminar on Minority Economic Development, Harvard Law School).
* SBA National Directive 51o-xA, Appendix ig, at 30 (Jan. 24, x969); See also x3 C.F.R. § 122.20(b)
(970).
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1970." A file was set up and the application was marked "accepted, Febru-
ary i, 1970."
-March 18, I 97O-Loan approved. 6
SBA personnel play an important part in Rig the Game. The effectiveness of a
lending program where profit is not the declared objective depends on the attitudes
of the men involved and their willingness to get the job done. One man in the
SBA network can adversely affect the progress of an application. A reluctant regional
director could refuse many of the loans requested, and similar attributes in the
assistant director for financial assistance could mean a drop in the number of loan
recommendations made to the regional director.
Implementation of SBA programs varies greatly from city to city. According to
a recent study, the effectiveness of some regional offices differed by a ratio of sixteen
to one. 7  Where the decisions emanate from a sensitized Minority Enterprise
Team,3 8 the results have been much better. However, such a focus requires proper
direction from the higher levels of SBA. Sensitive and effective employees all along
" Britts, supra note 34, at 8.
"'Harris, Compensatory Capitalism: A Description and Evaluation of Project OWN, in Hearings on
the Organization and Operation of the Small Business Administration Before the House Select Comm. on
Small Business, 9st Cong., ist Sess. A32-A.35 (1969). The program submitted at fiscal year 1972
appropriations hearings showed the following data:
SBA LOAN APPROVALS*-MINORITY AND NONMINORITY
[In thousands of dollars]
Fiscal year 1971
(March 1971) Fiscal year 1970 Fiscal Year i969
Minority type Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount
Black .......................... 3,215 $ 87,424 4,083 $107,639 3,362 $77,135
Puerto Rican .................... 662 13,334 846 16,925 61o 10,133
American Indian ................. 235 7,9X2 228 5,948 91 2,147
Spanish American ................ 1,033 23,018 871 19,239 461 9,953
Asian .......................... 218 11,532 205 10,102 114 4,852
Eskimos and Aleutian ............ 29 738 29 514 8 112
Subtotal ..................... 5,392 143,958 6,262 160,367 4,646 104,332
Undetermined ................... 34 948 42 2,293 i1O 5,607
Other, including white ........... 9,124 588,404 8,798 546,950 9,754 588,134
Total ......................... 14,550 733,310 15,102 7o9,6IO 14,510 698,073
OExcludes disaster loans.
Hearings on Appropriations for the Dept's of State, Justice and Commerce, the judiciary and Related
Agencies for Fiscal Year 1972 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 9 2d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. IV, at 629 [hereinafter referred to as SBA FY x972 House Appropriations Hearings].
" The function of a Minority Enterprise Team (MET) is to (a) coordinate SBA programs to stim-
ulate minority owned business through expansion of existing businesses or creation of new businesses,
(b) identify potential minority entrepreneurs, (c) assist minority businessmen with loan applications to
banks, and (d) assist in providing managerial and technical assistance as necessary. The MET works
principally in the ghetto and can therefore develop a close relationship with its businessmen. For a
complete discussion of MET, see Hearings on the Organization and Operation of the Small Business Ad-
ministration Before the House Select Committee on Small Business, 9st Cong., ist Sess., at Aio (1969).
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the chain of decision might serve to eliminate some of the large regional differences.
A sufficient number of employees to handle the volume of work is also necessary. It
is irrational to establish a program which is heralded as the cure-all for eliminating
problems in business opportunity and then staff it so inadequately that it can not
accomplish its goals without maximum inconvenience to its applicants. Yet unless
SBA takes such actions, it will continue to Rig the Game.
B. MESBIC Program
SBA plays another variation of Rig the Game with minority businessmen who
apply for assistance in setting up a minority enterprise small business investment
company (MESBIC). In 1969, SBA, in cooperation with the Department of Com-
merce, instituted the MESBIC program. MESBIC's were created by adopting the
SBIC program, as authorized by the Small Business Act. 0 Through MESBIC's, the
express purpose of SBIC's, supplying venture capital and long term financing, was
to be directed toward minority small business concerns. All SBIC's are authorized
to purchase stock or debt securities issued by small businesses and thereby provide
venture capital and financing. The MESBIC's have usually been created as sub-
sidiaries of large corporations, which in turn provide the necessary private capital
for the MESBIC's operations. Since MESBIC's are treated as separate entities for
SBA loans and for income tax purposes, they are an attractive investment for large
corporations.
The opportunity for minority ownership of MESBIC's has been limited.
MESBIC's are subject to Gotta Bring Your Own Ball, and the minimum private
investment required is $Sio,ooo.4° With $3ooooo of SBA assistance, the MESBIC
can accumulate $450,000 for investment. As large as this figure appears to be, it is
far from adequate to establish a successful MESBIC. SBIC's which are capitalized
for less than Si million have rarely been successful, and three to five million dollars
is a more realistic figure for success. 4 ' Since it is very difficult for a minority
group to find financial backing of $i million to $2 million size factors alone make
the program inaccessible to minority businessmen and thus the game is ",rigged."4
Moreover, any firm the MESBIC invests in must make a ioo per cent to 500 per
cent profit increase before the MESBIC benefits.43 This is too much to expect from
the overwhelming number of businesses which ask MESBIC's for investment capital.
so 15 U.S.C. §§ 68I-87d (1964). Relevant SBA regulations are contained in 13 C.F.R. §§ I07.1-141
(1970).
" SBA: WHAT IT Is, supra note 9, at 15.
'
1 Rosenbloom & Shank, MESBIC Myopia: The Department of Commerce and Minority Economic
Development, April 1970 (unpublished paper on file at the Center for Community Economic Development,
Cambridge, Mass.). To encourage larger investments, SBA provides a three to one match for over $i
million in private investment.
The MESBIC program is not that attractive to large corporations either, since they must subsidize
a significant portion of early expenses. This additional drain on corporate resources deters many corpora-
tions from becoming meaningful sources of venture capital. Thus, minority groups are not the only
ones subjected to SBA "games."
"'Interview with James Hill, President of PRIME (Pooled Resources In Minority Enterprise), a
MESBIC, in Detroit, Feb. '5, 1971.
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Another SBA version of Rig the Game involves the requirement that invest-
ments by a MESBIC must be in a business owned or managed by at least fifty per
cent minority personnel." Such a business has less chance for success than other
businesses, because of the special problems faced by blacks and other minorities.45
All new businesses have limited chances for success, but the problems of an inner-
city business are compounded. Additional problems stem from the historical lack
of business experience among minorities.
SBA guidelines further inhibit a minority role in MESBIC operations. MESBIC's
are required to have two full-time managers on their staffs before a license will be
granted.4 6 This requirement implies a permanent office and related expenses which
can result in overhead of $35,ooo-$6o,ooo a year or more for even the smallest MESBIC.
SBA further requires that such expenses be paid out of revenues, not invested cap-
ital.4 7 It is absurd to believe that an investment company capitalized at from
$45o,ooo to $i million, and with its funds committed to newly emerging minority
businesses, can generate this kind of cash from early operations. Often the sponsoring
parent organization must maintain the MESBIC staff on its own payroll and pay
the overhead expenses. The success story of AIC (the MESBIC of Arcata) illustrates
the fact that a benevolent parent is the only reason the MESBIC has prospered. 48
In actuality a MESBIC can only operate as a subsidiary division of a strong,
benevolent, and well-heeled parent and not as a separate business unit in any meaning-
ful sense.
Another aspect of Rg the Game involves the size of -the loans a MESBIC
can make. Under SBA regulations a SBIC can not invest any more than twenty
per cent of its capital in any single investment. Such a limitation may reduce the
risk to the MESBIC from over-concentration, but it also eliminates ventures of sig-
nificant scale and encourages only "Ma and Pa" tokenism. Moreover, because such
businesses tend to be marginal, quantum change is inhibited. Ownership of such
enterprises does little to give minorities any significant economic role, particularly
if grocery stores and dry cleaning establishments are given preference over man-
ufacturing firms and more extensive business which could employ many more times
the number of people.
" SMALL BusiNEss ADnims;rAxrTioN, MESBIC, MIoNRIY ENTERPISE SM.. BusINESs INVESTMENT
COMPANY x (undated) [hereinafter referred to as MESBIC].
' Since so few minority businesses survive the SBA qualification games, it is not surprising that the
SBA experience with minority businesses has been as good or better than with other types of businesses
assisted by SBA. Interview with James Hill, supra note 43. The loss statistics, covering actual and
estimated losses from March 1967 through fiscal year 1970, with respect to loans to blacks as contrasted
with loans to whites reveal that for EOLS there were 9.88% losses on loans to blacks of $69 million and
9.94% losses on loans to primarily whites of $4x million. For regular 7(a) business loans there were
3.x6% losses on loans to blacks of $66 million and 1.21% losses on loans to primarily whites of $972
million. SBA FY z972 House Appropriations Hearings 630.
"Rosenbloom & Shank, supra note 41, at 5.
'
7 Id. But see, MESBIC, supra note 44, at 2. That publication states that although government funds
or grants may not be used to capitalize a MESBIC, such grants may be used to cover operating expenses
if this is not specifically prohibited by the terms of the grants.
"
8 Rosenbloom & Shank, supra note 41, at 3.
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If SBA is to succeed, it must be willing to take more risks with its loan funds.
A sincere commitment to minority economic development will require that Con-
gress accept the concept that such loans are inherently risky. SBA should thus be
authorized to expend funds consistent with this philosophy.49 Only then, will SBA
be willing to take chances and only then will existing self-protective SBA constraints
be removed. As the program is now implemented, minority businessmen take all
the risks in a game they cannot win.
As these game analogies indicate, a new and radically different approach must
be taken by SBA if this program is to succeed. The present program seems to dictate
that the profitable SBIC's will be of the least help to small businesses. The basic
purposes of fostering minority enterprise will not be served unless the SBA program
supports development of some large and efficient enterprises which can compete
openly in the mainstream of American business. Some alteration of MESBIC size
requirements and loan amounts must be made. Rules preventing initial operating
expenditures to be paid from capital must be changed to allow the possibility of
minority ownership of MFESBIC's. Similarly, the ratio of SBA loan amount to private
capital must be increased to permit minority ownership, despite their more limited
capital sources. MESBIC's can benefit the minority community without "colonizing"
such areas only where they are not dependent upon and not controlled by the
same interests from which the community seeks to establish a degree of independence.
C. Local Development Company Program
SBA also has its games for the local development company (LDC) program."
Come Play with Me in this case involves attractive (nine to one) leveraging through
LDC's for loans to finance small businesses. SBA can lend up to $35o,0oo to each
small business assisted by an LDC.5" The loans are intended to assist community
development, as distinguished from solely individual entrepreneurs.5 2 The LDC
must have a minimum of twenty-five stockholders, and the operations of the LDC
must be limited to a specified area, with at least seventy-five per cent of its voting
control held by persons living within the operations area.53 The LDC can make
loans to businesses affiliated with or owned by the members of the LDC so long as
none of the owners being assisted has more than twenty-five per cent voting control.
The most effective use of an LDC is to employ it as part of the corporate shell for
- The SBA budget request for FY 1971 was $320,50o,ooo. This figure represented an increase of
$74,j83,ooo over FY 197o appropriations. Of this amount it was proposed that $xo,ooo,ooo be used for
the MESBIC program which is an increase of $5,ooo,ooo over FY 1970 use. Hearings on Appropriations
for the Dept's of State, justice, and Commerce, and the Judiciary and Related Agencies for Fiscal Year
x971 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, gist Cong., 2nd Sess., Pt. 4, at 802, 803
(1970) [hereinafter referred to as SBA Hearings].
50 1 U.S.C. § 696 (1964); 13 C.F.R. § 108.502 (1970). There is also a state development company
program, but it is relatively inactive. See 13 C.F.R. § io8.501 (970).
" SBA: WHAT IT Is, supra note 9, at 7.52 1d.
as Id.
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a community development corporation (CDC) that carries on other economic de-
velopment activities.
After interest is aroused, SBA's LDC program administration begins to play Rig
the Game. The loans available from SBA have limited usefulness. Such loans apply
primarily to the financing of plant construction, conversion, or expansion (including
the acquisition of land)." This financing cannot be employed to support the full
range of activities necessary for development of a small business. Extensive controls
by SBA are involved in each loan which an LDC makes. 5 The applicant must be
identified with a particular small business, and at both the time of approval and dis-
bursement the LDC must show that the funds will be used by a small business.
The resultant Time Delay tactic complements SBA's playing of Rig the Game.
The application and approval process for each loan can be long and tedious. Thus,
the LDC will not have the flexibility to determine its own investment policy, and
it will not have SBA funds available to take ready advantage of promising invest-
ments. The LDC acts solely as a loan packager, sponsor, and guarantor for SBA
loans to a small business. In spite of -the LDC's guarantee, SBA still scrutinizes each
loan carefully and grants only those with very low risk of loss possibilities. The LDC
seems to serve no meaningful purpose except as a "buffer" for SBA in locating
loan applicants.
Rig the Game does not always lead to You Fail. However, such impediments
often make the LDC program ineffective. Consequently, the best use for an LDC
would be as a passive instrument, to be activated only when a section 5o2 loan is
made. An LDC should not be perceived as an active corpus for community develop-
ment.
D. The Section 8(a) Program
Come Play with Me, as applicable to section 8(a) of the Small Business Act of
1953, is the potential for SBA, as prime contractor, to enter into contracts with other
federal agencies for supplies and services and to then subcontract the work out to
small minority firms.ss SBA is able to negotiate the subcontracts under this pro-
gram, and the lowest bidder does not necessarily' receive the job. SBA, thus, can
direct the work to a small business. Firms awarded these contracts are eligible to
receive free management and technical aid in their operations.
The section 8(a) program looks promising, but its implementation leaves much
to be desired. The minority businessman is forced to participate in Gotta Play with
Those Guys, in this case with other government agencies which do not want to
play with him or SBA would not have had to exercise its powers under section
8(a). This situation seems a clear invitation for failure.
I"d.
The principal difference between a MESBIC and an LDC is that a MESBIC handles its own loans,
whereas an LDC must get each loan individually approved by the SBA. Also, an LDC may fund fixed
assets, whereas a MESBIC can fund fixed assets and operating capital.
" 8(a) CONTRACTING, supra note 13, at 2.
LAw AND CompoRARxY PROBLEMS
The decision to enter into contracts with SBA is left to bargaining between
SBA and the procurement officers of the respective government agencies. Therefore,
the success of SBA under this program depends on the consent of another agency
to apply its appropriations to this additional social purpose. If and when government
contracts are granted, small businesses must tolerate low profit margins, rigorously-
applied performance standards, legal complexities, vast amounts of paperwork, and
other hazards typical of government involvement.
President Nixon's five-year plan to increase section 8(a) contracting may lead
to more effective use of the programY Until recently SBA had not extensively
utilized section 8(a),5" but if there is a sudden increase in section 8(a) contracts, the
agency will have to expand its staff in order to handle the new volume of business.
SBA also plays a version of Rig the Game with the section 8(a) program which
includes the standard Time Delay tactic and the limited nature of assistance avail-
able through SBA. The section 8(a) program also has suffered from the lack of
experience of SBA personnel in the contracts they must administer. Further, often
it takes too long for a government agency to work through SBA, and consequently
contracts of an immediate nature are sent elsewhere. Finally, although the picture
is improving, another aspect of Rig the Game for this program is the fact that the
contracts are seldom of sufficient size to make much difference to minority firms.80
Small contracts can be useful if there is sufficient volume, but this is unlikely to occur.
II
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY-TTLE I-D
A. Special Impact Program
OEO's version of Come Play with Me concerns tide I-D of the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act of 1964,60 which provided for the creation of Special Impact programs to
address the critical problems of "dependency, chronic unemployment, and rising
community tensions" within those urban areas having an especially large concentra-
tion of low-income persons, and within those rural areas having substantial out-
migration from eligible urban areas. Each program receiving OEO funding had to
57 See, SBA Hearings, supra note 49, at 803. More emphasis will be placed on section 8(a) and more




"The March, 1971, summary of section 8(a) contract awards showed:
No. of Contracts Total (millions)
FY 1968 8 10.5
1969 30 9.0
X970 196 22.25
1971 to date 351 29.5
Excluding one $5 million contract to Aerojet General, the average contracting was $70,000. If one
assumes a 7-8% profit margin, that means only $49o0 to $56oo profit to the firm.Go42 U.S.C. §§ 2763-68 (Supp. V, 1970).
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be "of sufficient size and scope to have an appreciable impact on the [community]."'"
The OEO grants in fiscal year 1969 generally went to community development
corporations (CDC's) and averaged about $i million each. This represents ninety
per cent of a project's cost, the remaining ten per cent being supplied by the private
sector.02 Potentially these grants could have great flexibility and, if granted in large
enough amounts, could have the impact intended.
The grant funds may be used for a variety of investment programs which will
create jobs for poverty area residents, improve living conditions, develop man-
agerial and entrepreneurial skills, and create opportunities for participation in owner-
ship of production and commercial facilities by poverty area residents. Special Impact
grants have also been made to venture capital pools. 3
The Special Impact program has especially suffered from government game
playing, particularly Change the Rules and Rig the Game. OEO has usually
granted enough money for a minority group to begin operating but not nearly
enough money for any group to become successful. Partly this was due to limited
use of title I-D appropriations for community development corporations. In fiscal
1969, Congress alloted $ii million for OEO use;(4 for fiscal i97o, $3o million was
allocated out of $36 million alloted. Of this, $2o million went for urban CDC's, and
of that, $io million went to just one, Bedford-Stuyvesant. 5 Second, the average $i
million grant given to each program is hardly enough to create a "substantial impact"
in any large urban area. In fact, $i million is a small amount of capital with which
to begin a SBIC or other community organization of any magnitude whatsoever.
Although the ten per cent, Gotta Bring Your On Ball, private contribution require-
ment is not too stringent, only fifty applicants raised such private funds and went
through the rigors of See if You Qualify in fiscal year 1969. Only ten of these were
accepted by OEO for funding0 It is doubtful that organizers will be able to main-
tain the requisite funds every year to qualify for the program when the chances are
only one in five that federal aid will be forthcoming. But spreading the wealth to
other applicants, of course, would only assure shortfunding of the first recipientspT
a'Id. §§ 2763, 2764 (Supp. V, 1970).
"Federal grants to any program shall not exceed go% of the cost of such program, including cost
of administration, unless the director determines that assistance in excess of such percentage is required.
15 U.S.C. § 2768 (Supp. IV, i969). Thus the standard is flexible, and the 9o% limit is not an absolute
barrier to qualified persons who cannot acquire the necessary capital.
"Office of Economic Opportunity, Guidelines for OEO Special Impact Program Fiscal Year 1969,
at 5 (undated mimeo. on file at the Harvard Law Review) [hereinafter referred to as OEO Guidelines].
"See Hearings on Appropriations for the Dept's of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare, and
Related Agencies for Fiscal Year 197o Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, gIst
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 8, at 336, 338 (ig6g) [hereinafter referred to as OEO Hearings]. $8.3 million
went to 8 urban CDC's and $2.5 million to 7 rural CDC's. Letter to author from Joseph Halbach, Director,
Economic Development Division, Office of Program Development, OEO, July 20, x971.
"Halbach letter, supra note 64.
0' OEO Guidelines, supra note 63, at 5.
'Of the $3o million in fiscal year 1970 only 5 of the 8 urban CDC's first funded were funded again;
In fiscal year 1971, 7 of the first 8 CDC's were funded again; 4 of those funded for the first time in
fiscal year 1970 were dropped and one new one added. Halbach letter, supra note 64.
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B. Opportunities Funding Program
If the player is successful in obtaining title I-D funds, Withdraw the Aid, another
version of Rig the Game, begins. Programs which receive funds one year and are
on the verge of becoming successful may offend local interests, and funds for future
years may be curtailed. In order to make the "substantial impact" required under
its legislation, however, title I-D funding should continue for a number of years.
Failure to do so because of political pressures or "spread the wealth" philosophies
make the original investment worthless. Moreover, such action reinforces minority
perceptions of white hypocracy.
A further problem in the administration of the I-D grants involves the pervasive
controls imposed on recipients by grant provisions. OEO still requires specific ap-
proval of each investment project. Technical assistance seems appropriate, but little
capacity will be developed in the grantee if every investment decision is subject to
prior approval.
The Nixon Administration has instituted a significant version of Change the Rules
for tide I-D funds. This has involved administrative change-over for a portion of
these funds to a new program, Opportunity Funding. Opportunity Funding takes a
different approach than Special Impact with respect to emphasis on particular com-
munities. Using the Special Impact funds, Opportunity Funding does not concentrate
on an "impact" area, but attempts to stimulate outside businesses to invest in the
inner city. Opportunity Funding has three principle goals:
(i) to determine the loss factor when private credit and capital are engaged
in low-income area projects and to identify those situations where losses can
be kept within tolerable limits;
(2) to determine whether the use of proven guarantee, banking, and incentive
arrangements will substantially increase the flow of private capital and credit
into low income communities;
(3) to determine whether the information resulting from these pilot projects
furnishes a basis for legislation to help achieve economic growth in low
income communities. 
8
It was OEO's opinion that these goals could be met with a resulting rise in the
strength of the commercial banking and savings vehicles currently present in target
communities.P9
An Opportunity Funding corporation is composed of three units, an opportunity
guarantee component, which considers capital and credit problems, a community
development component, which handles the marketing of inner-city business securi-
63 OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, OPPORTUNITY FUNDING, AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DEM.
ONSrRATION PROGRAm i (1 970) [hereinafter referred to as OEO OPoRTuNITy FUNDING].
"I d. at 2.
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ties, and an incentive simulator component, which attempts to encourage private
business investment in low income communities.T°
While the goals of the Opportunity Funding program cannot be questioned, there
are grave questions about the means by which they are to be attained. The legality
of the program is questionable, since it uses tide I-D funds, which were designed to
be used exclusively in selective poverty areas.? Opportunity Funding attempts to
diffuse the funds into a large number of areas, a policy which frustrates the tide
I-D concentration policy. The program also has selected only one isolated element,
capital flow, out of all the poverty area problems, while title I-D was explicitly con-
ceived as a multipurpose, coordinated attack upon many levels of problems. The
Opportunity Funding program uses funds for a research and demonstration program
which seems contrary to the goal of "arresting tendencies toward dependency, chronic
unemployment, and rising community tension" of title I-D.72 Such administrative
shifts leave little or no opportunity for the countergame of Legal Review, since former
title I-D recipients may have questionable standing to sue and strong disincentives to
challenging their funding source. Switching to Opportunity Funding, moreover,
intensifies Rig the Game because it reduces the limited tide I-D funds available
to community development corporations.
Opportunity Funding forces the minority businessman into Gotta Play with Those
Guys. To get assistance, he must go to the beneficiaries of Opportunity Funding, the
banks, insurance companies, and other financial sources. Without more leverage or
more desirable benefits available to these institutions, their aid will still contain the
same restraints on low income investments that it did prior to OEO influence. OEO
funds would be put to better use if Opportunity Funding concentrated more on
making ghetto businesses better credit risks than on attempting to influence more
lending institutions to lend money to risky, unstable ghetto businesses. Change the
Rules also applies here since another level of bureaucracy has been added under
Opportunity Funding. Special Impact funds are handled directly by OEO, but Oppor-
tunity Funding grants must go through OEO and then Opportunity Funding's com-
ponent administrator." This needless duplication swallows up more. of the title I-D
allocation in administrative expenses.
The Special Impact funding of CDC's has come to be recognized as the most
fruitful program yet tried in a low-income community74 Opportunity Funding,
"
t
o Id. at 5, 6.
71 5 U.S.c. § 552 (1967). In fiscal year 1970, $3.9 million was diverted from title I-D funds for the
use of the opportunity funding program; less was diverted in fiscal year 1971. Halbach letter, supra note
64.
6 Id. A technical analysis of the insecure legal status of the Opportunity Funding Program is
presented in a memorandum from Bert Griffin and David Madway to Donald Rumsfeld, OEO Director,
April 2, 1970.
7' OEO OPPORrTUNy FmrING, supra note 68, at 3.7 t For example, the Special Impact funding of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Section of Brooklyn has been
widely heralded; see Highlight Memorandum, Special Impact Program (Title I-D) Grant No. CG-8532,
Aio. Specific accomplishments include a job creation program, community home improvement program,
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however, proposes to use its funds for purposes at odds with or unrelated to such
a community participation approach. Lacking OEO funding, CDC's will not be
able to continue to build a community participation model for economic develop-
ment.
Moreover, Opportunity Funding continues a form of Rig the Game by the very
nature of its emphasis on loan programs. In simple terms, Opportunity Funding is
directed toward supplying the minority businessman with debt capital. It is debt
financing, however, that usually overloads a business and restricts its growth. The
critical difference here is that Special Impact can provide desperately-needed equity
capital without burdening minority businesses with the less attractive debt funding.
III
ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
The Economic Development Administration (EDA) was created in x965 as an
agency of the Department of Commerce by an act which authorized a wide range
of programs to help distressed communities attract new industry and permanent
jobs.75 These programs include grants and loans for development facilities, industrial
and commercial loans, and technical planning and research assistance.
EDA plays an intricate form of See if You Qualify. Relying on data supplied
by the Department of Labor, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of
Commerce, it designates areas which may be considered for aid. Each designated
area then must prepare an overall economic development program (OEDP) within
six months after it has received notice of its designation. 6 If an area fails to submit
an OEDP, it will become ineligible for consideration by EDA for two years." If the
OEDP is approved by EDA, the area will be officially designated as a "redevelopment"
area and EDA will state which types of assistance are available to the area. Each
specific project in an area is examined, and aid is given only to those projects which
meet other EDA standards.78
Urban areas may qualify as "redevelopment" areas in four ways:70
(i) as areas of "substantial and persistent unemployment";
(2) as areas with "low median family income";
(3) as areas which have lost a major employer producing added unemployment;
(4) as areas designated Special Impact areas0°
community facility development, manpower development, and housing development. See also Economic
Opportunity Hearings, supra note x.
Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3226 (Supp. V, 1970).
5 8 O'Connell, Financidal Assistance Available from the Economic Development Administration, in 6
LAw NovEs 16 (1969).7 7 1d.
"' These standards vary depending on the type of proposed project. Usually the amount of investment
money available for the project plays an important role in its consideration. Note, supra note 28, at
z648. See also O'Connell, supra note 76, at 18, for an example of project requirements.
7942 U.S.C. § 316(a) (1966).
so For a discussion of the limited nature of this qualification, see p. 8o supra.
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The minimum "area" size under the Act is either an entire city, county, or
metropolitan area.!' See if You Qualify has effectively eliminated almost the entire
country. For most areas, the statistics do not accurately describe conditions in smaller
portions within their boundaries. Therefore, the high unemployment and low family
income of the ghettos are often hidden for purposes of EDA. Very few areas have
been designated Special Impact localities under OEO, so this qualification does
little to aid the expansion of EDA programs. Qualifications (i)-(0) are so severe and
rigorous that only three major cities had by 1969 qualified under (I) and (2),2 and
sections of only three cities had qualified under (3) -3
EDA's approach to economic development consists primarily of attracting strong
businesses to locate in economically depressed areas! 4 As a result, minority business-
men are forced into Gotta Play with Those Guys. Large, established corporations
and business are the associates a minority businessman must take. Another form
of Gotta Play with Those Guys results from another EDA regulation, which pro-
vides that before any aid is given, both state and local government agencies for
economic development must approve of the project. The applicant has no right to
attempt to reverse state and local objections at the federal level."5 This requirement
gives state and local agencies considerable power over organizations interested in
EDA aid.
EDA also plays a very rigorous game of No Mistakes Allowed. In its evaluation
of the eligibility for assistance of a low-profit, marginal business, EDA places em-
phasis upon demonstrated and exceptional management competence86 EDA also per-
mits little leeway in project design and retains tight supervisory control over all of its
funds. Even minor programmatic changes must be approved, and no room is left for
the use of discretion by project officials!'
EDA assistance comes with even tighter controls than financial aid from tradi-
tional sources. It definitely is not a program which will promote economic activity
of any magnitude for minority firms. The number of areas qualifying for aid and
the amounts available for distribution are too small. Everything EDA proposes to do
can be done by other government agencies and private lending institutions with
81 42 U.S.C. § 3 151 (b) (4). Some exceptions have been made for labor market areas which are portions
of cities. See note 83 infra.82 The cities are Newark, Oakland, and Cleveland. U.S. Dept. of Commerce News Release, EDA
69-29o at 3 (June 29, I969).
"' These were Brooklyn's Navy Yard area, and the Chicago and Omaha stockyard districts. U.S. Dept.
of Commerce News Release, supra note 82, at 3.
"' "Our objective is to assist such areas to achieve stable and independent job-creating economics by
encouraging private businessmen to establish or expand facilities there." Hearings on Appropriations for
the Dept's of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for Fiscal Year z97o
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 9ist Cong., and Sess., pt. 3, at 61, Testimony
of Asst. Secretary Robert Podesta [hereinafter referred to as EDA Hearings]. See also U.S. DEP'T. OF
CozsatERcE, EDA HAiDBOOK 32 (1968).
8142 U.S.C. § 3142(b)(2), (io) (Supp. IV, 1969); EDA HANDBooK, supra note 84, at 36, 37.
88 EDA HANDBOOK, supra note 84, at 35.
"'Note, supra note 28, at 1645.
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fewer restraints and less red tape. Although EDA has significant funds, s their use
is so restricted as to be of little value for minority economic development."'
IV
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
A. Model Cities
The Model Cities program was intended to provide "additional financial and
technical assistance" above that available from existing federal grant-in-aid pro-
grams. 0 It has a broad mandate in slum areas to expand housing, jobs, and income
opportunities; to reduce dependence upon welfare payments; to improve educational
facilities and programs; to combat disease and ill health; to reduce the incidence
of crime and delinquency; to enhance recreational and cultural opportunities; to
establish better access between homes and jobs; and generally to improve the quality
of life.'
Model Cities funds come from and are controlled by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). The program has wide-sweeping potential appli-
cation in the field of urban economic development. Funds are supposed to be
responsive to local determination and use. 2 There is an elaborate planning process
built into the programY3 Unfortunately, despite efforts to reduce federal control
of local decisions,94 the Model Cities program maintains extensive review procedures
and close federal supervision of projects. When contemplating a new major federal
program, one can hope its administrators would learn from previous mistakes made
by government agencies and eliminate some of the games in the administration
of the new program. But the contrary is more apt to be true: the Model Cities
program displays its own version of most of the games which have previously been
discussed.
One hundred and fifty cities were chosen to receive Model Cities grants.Y' In
each selected city, a Model Cities area or neighborhood was outlined, and a city
demonstration agency (CDA) was designated by the local government to concen-
"
8 Appropriations for FY 197o reached $271,oo,oo0. Funding requested for FY x971 is $263,ooo,ooo.
EDA Hearings, supra note 84, at 58.
"' During calendar year i969, EDA made only 38 business loans which averaged about $ million.
Id. at 64, 75. Indications from the hearings are that this small number will drop even lower in the
coming years. Evidence of this decline is illustrated by the fact that requested funding for FY 1971 is
down $8 million from FY 197o appropriations. See note 88 supra.
"
0 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-13 (Supp.
IV, 1g6).
°'42 U.s.C. § 3303(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
92 The Senate Committee report stresses that the "character and content of the program must be based
on local judgment as to the cities' needs"; S. REP. No. 1,439, 89 th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1966).
"
5See 42 U.S.C. § 3304 (Supp. V, 1970).
"See 42 U.S.C. § 33o3(b)(i) (Supp. V, 1970).
" Hearings on the Progress of the Model Cities Program Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 9st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1969).
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trate and coordinate federal, state, and local public and private programs within
the area.0 See if You Qualify is played indirectly through restrictions imposed on
the CDA, which in turn is to apply the rules to those requesting the CDA funds.
Thus, recent HUD regulations indicate that to obtain Model Cities money
one must play certain qualifying games 7 One is a form of Gotta Play with Those
Guys, where minority businessmen come under regulations which require that,
normally, Model Cities funds be used in conjunction with private capitalYs Con-
sequently, Model Cities funds should not be used to provide loans to business enter-
prises in the absence of participation by other lenders or guarantorsY9 Since the local
administering agency (CDA) and the local governing body (city council) must
approve all projects funded by Model Cities, Gotta Play with Those Guys forces
recipients to play with local government as well as private "partners." In a positive
sense Model Cities attempts to prevent Only One Game at a Time. Use of funds
from SBA, OEO, and EDA is encouraged.' 0 The logic of Model Cities cannot be
faulted, for government agencies must begin to coordinate their efforts. But, com-
mendable as the idea is, Model Cities money cannot be used with that of the other
federal program if other federal agencies will not cooperate.
Although HUD professes that major program decisions lie with local govern-
ments,101 the Department has engaged in a spirited version of Change the Rules
which severely restricts local initiative. It is often difficult for minority enterprises
to determine what Tules are in effect. For example, the recent HUD regulations
on economic development only became "official" in November, 1970, while informal
rules had been applied since July, 1969j"0 Previously, the area of economic develop-
ment had been left to local discretion, aside from general HUD review of projects
and local programs 0 3 Administrators at HUD, nevertheless, did not hesitate to
Change the Rules applicable to this program area when they desired.
" This was in accordance with the provisions set out in 42 U.S.C. § 330, (Supp. V, 1970). The CDA
was to work in conjunction with a citizen participation component, generally one elected by residents
of the model neighborhood.
"'The most recent HUD regulations were stated in HUD, CDA Letter Ioc Transmittal Notice MC
3135.1 Supp. 2 (Nov. 1970) [hereinafter referred to as CDA Letter ioc].
" Id. at 3. It suggested that Model Cities funds not be used on a grant basis. Alhough these guidelines
became official in November, 1970, the discussion of the Citizens Urban Opportunity Fund Program below
will illustrate that these more stringent guidelines were in fact frequently used prior to that date.
" "Every effort shall be made to obtain the participation of private lenders in financing businesses." Id.
20 0 Id.
o ' "The purpose of the Model Cities Program is to achieve, through the carrying out of plans developed
by local governments and their citizens, substantial improvement in the quality of life of people living
in blighted city neighborhoods." CDA Letter No. 1, at 1, Oct. 30, 1967. "Cities are encouraged to
experiment with new program approaches. Each city should determine its own program emphasis ...
Id. at 2.
See North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 428 F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir. 1970).
... Ie Secretary must determine under section 103(a) of the Act [42 U.S.C. § 3303(a)] that the
program submitted by the city is eligible for funding pursuant to the criteria set forth in that section.
Section io5(a) [42 U.S.C. § 3305(a) states: "The Secretary is authorized to approve comprehensive city
demonstration programs if, after review of the plans, he determines that such plans satisfy the criteria .... "
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B. Model Cities Case Studies
i. Philadelphia
HUD's imposition of Gotta Play with Those Guys and Change the Rules is
illustrated by a recent case involving the Model Cities program in Philadelphia.
In March, 1967, the city of Philadelphia applied for a planning grant from HUD for
its model neighborhood in North Philadelphia. The citizen participation component
of the program, the North City Area-Wide Council (AWC), was organized and
funded. Gotta Play wth Those Guys involved the city with AWC, and they jointly
proceeded during the ensuing year to plan for the execution phase of the program.
At the end of the planning period, on December 3, 1968, a comprehensive plan for
the first year of execution of the program was submitted to HUD. The plan required
$49 million, although only $25 million had been allocated by HUD for the Phila-
delphia program.1°4 During negotiations with the city's representatives, in addition
to suggesting the necessity to revise the request to fall within the targeted amount,
HUD raised "concerns" because AWC, the operator of many projects in the plan, was
also to evaluate its own effectiveness. HUD questioned the impartiality of evaluation
under such circumstances.
A revision of the plan by the city in cooperation with AWC was made by way
of a supplement sent to HUD on April 30, 1969. The supplement proposed a
wide range of programs to benefit the model neighborhood which were to be imple-
mented by the city agencies or existing private entities. The new plan also proposed
that a large portion of the program be carried out by seven new nonprofit corporations,
acting under contract with the city, with specific responsibilities for housing, land
use, health, education, and (significant here) economic development. To enhance
the citizen involvement in the corporations, a majority of the directors of four
of the corporations and significant minorities for the other three were to be selected
by the citizens of the model neighborhood through the AWC.
In May, 1969, HUD expressed reservations about the plan as now "supple-
mented" and reiterated its concern over AWC's dual involvement in the direction
of the corporations and evaluation of the program. In response to the HUD objec-
tions, the city submitted a further supplementary statement to HUD on June 9,
1969, without the participation or approval of AWC or other residents of the model
neighborhood. In that statement, the city agreed that only one-third of the directors
of any corporation could be appointed by AWC, the remaining members to be
appointed by organizations selected by the city with the "consultation" of AWC. The
final decision was to remain with the city. The city also reserved the right to appoint
such additional government representatives as directors as the city deemed appropriate.
Even this supplementary plan was apparently not sufficient for HUD, which on
July 3, 1969, found the city's latest proposal "acceptable" only if (i) citizens were
"°'Brief for Plaintiff at 2, North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, Civil No. 6919o9 (E.D.
Pa., Nov. 1o, 1969).
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forbidden to nominate as a director a member of AWC and, (2) after the first year,
board members were selected by some method other than nomination by AWCP°5
To emphasize its desire to control these matters, HUD only approved $3 million of
the $25 million, thus providing funds solely for administration activities pending
resolution of the dispute. Although the city offered to continue to contract with
AWC as the citizen participation component for the program, including $4i,o0o for
AWC's monthly operating budget, AWC tried to fight HUD's tactic of Change the
Rules and instituted the countergame, Legal Review. AWC's suit charged that
HUD had violated its own published regulations and its statute since the Act required
"widespread citizen participation" and an "emphasizing of local initiative in the
planning, development and implementation" of the program.106 AWC also asked
that its funding be continued and that the city be enjoined from using HUD funds
to aid any other citizen organization during the pending litigation.
The federal district court held that the Council lacked standing to maintain a
legal action and that even if requisite standing existed, neither HUD nor the city
had violated the regulations. On appeal the key issues before the Third Circuit
were: (I) Did AWC have adequate standing to sue? (2) Were HUD's actions a
legitimate exercise of departmental discretion and thereby not subject to judicial
review? and (3) Were the restraints imposed upon AWC consistent with statutory
emphasis and other legal precedent?
In a brief opinion"07 the court of appeals reversed the district court, holding
that (i) AWC had standing to sue by virtue of the decisions in Association of Data
Processing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp. 08 and Barlow v. Collins;10 9 (2) "[u]n-
less the language or structure of a particular statute precludes judicial review, there
is a presumption that administrative action is reviewable";... (3) the implementation
of the statute requires the constructive involvement of citizens in the model neighbor-
hood area; and (4) the city government is responsible for seeing that the citizens
are fully involved in policy making, planning, and execution of all program ele-
ments1 l In this case neither the requirements added on June 9, 1969, nor the require-
ments added on July 3, 1969, involved any citizen participation."12 The court ac-
knowledged that a veto power in the neighborhood citizens is not necessary, as was
"full citizen participation" not required for minor decisions. For major decisions
which may influence the basic strategy of the program, however, consultation with
"'North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 482 F.2d 754, 757 (3rd Cir. 1970).
1o 42 U.S.C. § 3 3o3(b) (i) (Supp. V, 1970).
107 428 F.2d at 754.
10 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
100 397 U.S. 159 (197o).
110 428 F.2d at 757. The court also noted: "Moreover, the issue here does not concern, as claimed by
the Government, 'agency action... committed to agency discretion by law.' (5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2)). In-
stead, it concerns the question whether the administrative agency has conformed with the statutory
requirements, and this question is a proper subject for judicial review." Id.
l"1 Id. at 758.
112 Id.
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the citizens' group is, in the court's view, essential. Thus, the court found the uni-
lateral actions by the city and HUD involving major modification of the program a
violation of the Act. The case was remanded to the district court and hearings were
held. The district court has subsequently ruled that despite the circuit court opinion,
AWC would not be reinstated and the revisions would stand.1 3
From this case one may fairly question the advisability of fighting "city hall"
by recourse to the countergame of Legal Review. AWC has been without funds
since July, 1969, and the corporations have not been active or effective in the areas
originally planned for them." 4 The lesson here may be that the minority business-
man must acquiesce to the government's often changing rules if he expects any federal
aid to be given. Particularly frustrating to AWC, however, was that once having ad-
justed to a particular set of rules, and having been successful in playing by them, the
AWC found that its success in self-determination was to be denied because of the
federal, not the city, bureaucracy. City revisions were clearly the direct result of
HUD's refusal to approve the program until supplementary changes were made.
Under a reasonable Teading of the statute, HUD had limited authority to request
these changes." 5 It had even less basis to make changes without regard to the
procedural due process set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act which requires
publication of new or revised regulations."" The experience of AWC, however,
illustrates that the courts may be rather limited vehicles for protecting the rights
of groups who are attempting to work within the system. Only if the admin-
.18 Opinion and Order, No. 69-i9o9, July 9, 1971. The district court seems to have failed to com-
prehend that there was a rule change by HUD, see note 138, infra; that the new rule should not be
applied retroactively; and, that any changes in the city's program, even absent a change in rules, should
have required consultation with the then citizen participation organization, AWC. Admittedly it was
a difficult case since a finding for AWC on any of these points would require reinstating AWC and negoti-
ations over program content. This would effectively stall the program for an additional period.
"'Telephone interview with Austin Norris, Director of Administration, Philadelphia Model Cities
Agency, Apr. 28, 1971. Of the seven proposed nonprofit corporations, only two have been organized: the
Urban Education Institute and the Economic Development Corporation. The former is operative, but the
latter has still to appoint its directors. The principal corporation is a section 501(c)(3), Model Cities
Community Foundation. There are two related corporations in the economic development complex for
the program, each with contractual relationships with the Foundation. One is the Model Cities Economic
Development Corporation, which as a stock issuing corporation will be an operating arm of the Founda-
tion. The other is an Urban Venture Capital Corporation, which is profit-making. One-half of its 200,000
shares will be purchased by the Foundation and the remainder sold to model neighborhood residents, there-
by providing paid-in capital in addition to the $7 million to be made available to the Venture Capital
Corporation for investment in inner-city businesses.
As a result of the law suit, Philadelphia delayed reorganization of a citizen participation component
until the initial successful result in the district court. HUD funds during the interim were also limited.
Sixteen local councils were organized. There was also a central body called a "Continuation Com-
mittee." At present, a 47-man Citizens Advisory Committee provides the citizen participation com-
ponent for the program. In addition to two representatives from each local council, there are 15 persons
appointed from the phase-out Continuation Committee. The basis for appointments of directors to the
economic development corporations are apparently substantially the same as set forth in the June 9 th
supplementary statement to the city's Model Cities Program.
"'See 42 U.S.C. § 3303(b) (I) (Supp. V, 1970).
1185 U.S.C. § 552(b) ()-(3) (Supp. I, 1967); See also 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. II, 1967); Skoler,
Legal and Quasi-legal Considerations in New Federal Aid Programs, 56 Gao. L.J. 1X44, 1155, & n.40
(1968).
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istrators of these programs feel bound by essential elements of fairness in applying
and living within their rules, as well as in the process of changing such rules, can
a wholesale and possibly violent challenge to our existing government be averted.
When some come to realize that the government is indeed "playing games" with
them, the reaction may become extreme.
There may have been valid reasons to question the potential for economic
development as envisioned by the newly-created and inexperienced corporations in
the Philadelphia program. But, if they constituted the agreed-upon program of the
city and AWC, once having raised these doubts, the federal bureaucracy was obligated
(as the circuit court determined) to abide by local decisions. In fact, difficulties with
federal control of local decisions have been one of the strong arguments for some
form of federal revenue sharing or bloc grants to localities."'
2. Detroit
In Detroit the effect of Change the Rules along with No Mistakes Allowed
has resulted in the demise of a promising and innovative program closely related
to economic development activities in the city's Model Cities program."' Detroit's
program, Plans for Progress, called for the establishment of a Citizens Urban Oppor-
tunities Credit Bank which would provide grants, loans, and loan guarantees for
various personal objectives. As set up in 1969 by contract with the city, the Citizens
Urban Opportunity Fund (CUOF), as it was renamed, incorporated the concepts
of "grants and loans to provide individual and community options and incentives
toward self-improvement." The program was to function as a "gap-filling revenue."
It was also to serve as the depository for funds to be distributed to other contractors
and to handle the disbursement and accounting for such other funds. There was
to be a ceiling upon grants, and variable interest was permitted on loans. In most
cases recipients were given vouchers exchangeable for goods. CUOF then redeemed
the vouchers from the merchant selected by the recipient. The Citizens Government
Board (CGB), the citizen participation component in the Detroit program, had
responsibility for the implementation of CUOF in "partnership" with the CDA.Y9
They were jointly to appoint a board of directors for CUOF, selecting both public and
"7 "The major difficulty is that States and localities are not free to spend these funds on their own
needs as they see them. The money is spent instead for things Washington wants and in the way Wash-
ington orders." Message form the President Relative to Revenue Sharing, Feb. 4, 1971, H.R. Doc.
No. 92-44 at 4, 92nd Cong., ist Sess. (1971). AWC's problems with respect to economic development
activities are not uncommon in the Model Cities program. In Fresno, California, one major difficulty
was the attempt to overcome SBA's Only One Game At A Time rule, so as to use Model Cities funds
to provide the initial capital to match SBA funds for SBIC. See Note, supra note 87, at 1558, 16o6 & n.86.
SBA still seems to be adamant about refusing to allow flexible use of Model Cities funds along with
SBA funded programs. See notes 27, 44 supra.
"" This program, Citizens Urban Opportunities Credit Bank (as it was first known), seemed to be one
of the more innovative approaches taken by Model Cities in developing new financing techniques to
overcome obstacles to full opportunities for development for both individuals and organizations. See
Hetzel & Pinsky, The Model Cities Program, 22 VAND. L. REV. 727, 743 (1969).
119 CoMPREHENsrvE DaEmoNsTRATioN PROGRAM, CITY OF DETROIT, CITIZEN'S UR.BAN OPPORTUNITY
CRrr BANx, PROyECr DasesuPTION 351 (1968).
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private representatives for the sixteen positions. CUOF's proposed budget was for
$i million plus administrative costs, and the Fund also was disbursement agent for
almost $5 million in additional program fundsj 20
Under the contract with the CDA, CUOF was to provide grants, loans, and loan
guarantees "to any person or group, for any purpose, for any amount, and under
any terms consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.'1 21 The CGB was to
select four directors, one from residents in each model neighborhood sub-area, and
one from each of five additional CGB standing committees that would be concerned
with CUOF's operations. The other seven directors were to be appointed by existing
organizations, both private and public, including a faculty member from a local law
school, a member of a commercial bank, and one from the staff of the model neigh-
borhood agency. Limits were set on grants and loans to individuals ($x5oo) and
groups ($i5,oo), unless higher amounts were approved by a two-thirds vote of the
directors. The contract was finally approved on February 3, 1970, with certain
standard HUD provisions attached. These included the requirement that "unearned
payments under the contract could be suspended or terminated upon refusal to accept
additional conditions that may be imposed by HUD at any time .... ,122 There were
also provisions permitting the CDA to terminate for cause or, with proper notice, for
convenience.
Rig the Game was also present there in the form of time delays. Seven months
elapsed between the time the city approved the plan and receipt of the funds by
the CDA. Another six months passed between receipt of the money by the CDA
and the signing of the CUOF contract on February 3, 1970. Following the contract
approval in February, intense pressure was generated to get the project operational
and to distribute the funds.'2 Nationally, HUD was under criticism for the small
amount of money which had actually been expended in the Model Cities program.
The pressure resulted in an acceleration of CUOF's activities to get the money to
the people that needed it. A foreseeable result of that process was the potential for
minimal adherence to administrative procedures, and, as a result thereof, there was
failure to conform to safeguards for the handling of money.
A new city administration took over in Detroit after the signing of the contract,
and the necessary result was a change in CDA directors 24 CUOF had been required
to take the CDA as a partner under the contract' Having adjusted to Gotta Play
with Those Guys for one CDA staff, CUOF was required to readjust and accept
120 id. at 55.
"I Contract, City of Detroit Model Neighborhood Agency and CUOF, Inc., at x (b), Scope of Services
z. (Feb. 3, 1970) [hereinafter referred to as CUOF Contract].
.22 Model Cities Administration, Supplementary General Conditions for Contracts with Operating
Agencies and Contractor (Incorporated by reference into CUOF Contract, Part I, 6, 2), MCGR 31o0.8
Appendix 6, page 2 (July 1969).
.. Detroit News, Sept. 27, 1970, § B, at 6; Detroit Free Press, June z5, X970, § A, at 3.
"' With election of a new mayor, the resignation of the CDA Director was accepted. A new Director
was appointed and took over about February, 1970.
"
5 CUOF Contract, supra note 121, at I.
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new personnel from its required partner. The necessary adjustment, as it turns out,
was unsuccessful. The new director for the CDA imposed tight administrative
control of the program. 26 According to some reports, he evidenced concern over
the operation of CUOF. 27 Then came the same Change the Rules problem which
AWC experienced in Philadelphia.
Although discussions apparendy were initiated between the CDA and HUD as
early as August, 1970,12 s on September 2i, 197o, a memorandum from HUD the
Regional Office in Chicago enunciated certain conditions for continued requisitions of
funds to CUOF. In brief HUD's concerns were:
"(i) CUOF seemed to have been making only grants and needed to develop some
ratio of grants to loans consistent with the understanding HUD thought it
had with the CDA some eighteen months earlier;
(2) some grants had gone to members of the board of directors, which HUD im-
plied created possible conflicts of interests;
(3) some of the grants seemed to be for purposes other than those for which
CUOF had authority;
(4) adequate 'eports on the use of the funds had not been provided the CDA
and HUD.'129
On the same day the CDA director set forth additional requirements in a letter to
CUOF:
The membership of the Board of Directors must conform to a July 29, 1970 "state-
ment of policy" which was "promulgated" by HUD which restricts CGB members
from serving on the CUOF Board and reduces the number who may be appointed
by the CGB to CUOF. 30
At the same time, this letter affirmed a unlilateral CDA reduction of $750,o00 in the
grant amount to CUOF, purportedly made in August, 197o.
From the above commentary by HUD and the CDA (and it is not clear
whether the federal response was at the request of the CDA or vice-versa) both
seemed to have imposed, along with appropriate requests for a firming-up of CUOF
procedures, new requirements which had not been agreed to by CUOF. As in the
situation faced by AWC, basic changes in the board of directors of CUOF were to
be required without any federal issuance of formal regulations. Moreover, these
requirements were clearly contrary to the specific provisions of the CUOF contract
with the CDA.'3 ' After attempts at negotiation, including a proposed agreement of
126 See sources cited in note 123 supra.
12i Id.1 2 8
d.
12 Memorandum from Alan Goldfarb, Regional Administrator to Sylvester Angel, Jr., CDA Director,
Sept. 21, 1970.
... Letter from Sylvester Angel, Jr. to Ralph Richardson, Sept. 21, 1970. It should be noted that the
only policy statement "promulgated" by HUD was CDA Letter boc, which was not issued until November,
x970.
231 CUOF Contract, supra note 121.
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understanding which seemed to resolve almost every issue,'32 CUOF went to court
to prevent the CDA cut-off of funds. 33 Disbursements were halted both by the CDA
and temporarily by the court. Attempts were then made by the CDA to go through
CUOF's transactions, and CUOF acceded to these requests. Based upon a superficial
examination of the books and review of some transactions, the CDA went before
the City Council to ask termination of the contract with CUOF.' 4 The CDA di-
rector, however, failed to present any evidence of impropriety before the Council,
and it refused to terminate the contract. 35 The investigation by the city of CUOF's
books and records, nevertheless, continued. The CDA again went before the
Council with some tentative audit findings. After heated debate and a threat by HUD
to cut off all Model Cities funds to Detroit, the Council voted five to four to terminate
the contract.'"
It should be noted that by the time that the September HUD memorandum came,
CUOF had been operating only six months under contract and had been actually
issuing funds for only two of those months. Thus, the CDA and HUD pressure were
illustrative of the game No Mistakes Allowed. It is difficult to see why the CDA and
HUD instead could not have halted funds for CUOF and required a revision of
procedures sufficient to assure that funds were not used improperly. The agreement
proposed by CUOF during negotiations on September 24, 197o, was sufficient to have
assured this result. In that proposal CUOF offered to establish a policy for loan-grant
ratios, although it had no knowledge of any agreement between HUD and the CDA in
that regard. Second, pending resolution of the conflict of interest issue raised by
HUD, CUOF offered to abide by the federal interpretation. With respect to the
purposes for which loans or grants could be made, CUOF offered to review such
criteria with the CDA and HUD, although it had thought that under its contract
with the city the type of loans or grants were in its sole discretion. Finally, CUOF
agreed to a review of certain grants it had made. It further agreed to limit for the
present its expenditures of funds to one-half of the original amount set forth in the
contract, 5oo,ooo. The question of the composition of the board of directors was
left to negotiation between the CGB and the CDA.3 7
These offers seem reasonable and perhaps would have resolved many of the
deficiencies which concerned HUD. From all of the circumstances, CUOF con-
cluded that the issue of citizen control seemed central in the dispute' 3 In part, that
182 Agreement of Understanding Between CUOF and MNA, Sept. 24, X970. See also Detroit News,
supra note x23, at 6-B.
... CUOF v. City of Detroit, et al., Civ. No. 165676 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., Sept. 22, 197o).
... Detroit News, supra note 123. This must have seemed to CUOF like bad faith since the ostensible
purpose of the review was to determine what had occurred and what changes were needed, not to
provide a basis to terminate the program.
25Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1970, at i.
1"" Detroit Free Press, Oct. 30, 3970, at 2.
.. Agreement of Understanding, supra note 132. Over $330,000 had been committed at that time.
... Detroit News, supra note 323. The CDA was seemingly only reflecting the change in policy of
HUD. In an address on July 8, x969, Robert Baida, the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Model Cities Admin-
istration, said: "Unfortunately, this administration inherited a philosophy in many areas of the country
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conclusion is reinforced by the recourse of HUD and CDA to the game No Mistakes
Allowed. This game effectively prevented CUOF from making the necessary
adjustments so that it could proceed in a more orderly fashion. Conceding that
mistakes had been made, the failure by the CDA and HUD to permit reorganization
seemed to CUOF to reflect the policy change toward limiting citizen participation
in the Model Cities program which had been made in Washington with the change
of administrations.
The difficulty was not the change in policy, so much as the way in which the change
was handled. Admittedly, the initial HUT) regulations were not necessarily a full
recitation of HUD's authority to set the role of citizens and their control of operating
agencies for Model Cities projects. Nevertheless, there was a failure to accord any
consideration to outstanding contract commitments (of which HUD had notice)
and an attempt at ex post facto imposition of the new policy. Moreover, this was
done prior to issuance of the new regulations. This type of agency action was de-
scribed in the article, The New Sovereign Immunity,"9 where it was characterized
as "sovereign lawlessness."' 4 That article also documents similar action taken by
the government in one of the OEO programs. In that case also the game of No
Mistakes Allowed was played to a similar conclusion for the recipient of the federal
funds.141
The analogy to ex post facto imposition of new regulations seems appropriate
here since it was not until November, i97o, that HUD formally issued its regulations.
Even then, they were not published in the Federal Register as is arguably required
by the Administrative Procedure Act.142 Although the Model Cities program is
relatively new and still developing, significant changes in policy should not be
arbitrarily or informally imposed. This is the clear import of that part of the
decision in North City Area-Wide Council v. Romney 43 in which the court con-
ments that the Secretary acted illegally in imposing additional significant terms of
his own without citizen consultation.'4.
Where there are existing contracts setting forth the rights and obligations of
the grantee city and sub-recipient CUOF, these provisions are subject to a yearly
review and could be revised or terminated at that time. The contract should not be
abrogated at the whim of the administering federal agency. This is not to say, how-
ever, that changes in policy and procedures should not be made-especially where they
may reflect additional wisdom in administering complex and novel programs. What
it does imply is that due process must be followed in making such changes. In
dedicated toward extensive citizen control. Because of this, many first and second round cities are
in difficulty with their programs, and in some cases we have found it necessary to require substantial
revisions prior to the tender of planning or execution contracts."
8' Calm & Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARv. L. REV. 929 (1968).
d0 I. at 930.
1
"I Id. at 930-34.
142 See note 1X4 supra. The concept of due process of law would seem to require no less.
i~l 428 F.2d 754 (3 d Cir. 197o).
"Id. at 758.
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addition, in keeping with the innovative spirit of the program, the operators of
projects should be counseled concerning their decisions, but allowed to make their
own mistakes. It is totally unrealistic to expect either perfection or immediate success
from newly developing corporations. Given the lack of effectiveness of most existing
efforts, new institutions responsive to self-determination needs are required, and it
is certainly not clear that all wisdom lies in Washington concerning the development
of local projects.
A final word should be uttered concerning the November, i97o, regulations.
They clearly involve the imposition of some of the games similar to those played
by other federal funding agencies. For instance, they require that grants not be used
to finance a business' 45 (Gotta Bring Your Own Ball); that there normally be par-
ticipation by private lenders or guarantors before HUD funds are loaned140 (Gotta
Play with Those Guys); and that for new corporations no more than one-third of
the directors be selected by the citizen participation component 47 (Change the
Rules). Other regulations contain restrictions on more than one member of CGB-
type boards serving on the new corporations' boards of directors. 48
Clearly some rules are needed to give direction to the economic development
aspects of the program. It is also apparent that waiver of these rules is possible in
appropriate circumstances. 149 These Model Cities rules are much less restrictive than
those of other federal programs. Unfortunately, however, there is insufficient recog-
nition of the potential of flexibility in providing venture capital for economic develop-
ment activities. Such flexibility seems not only consistent with but mandated by a
bloc grant program such as Model Cities. But the critical need is for venture capital
to start businesses. If controls are to be imposed, they should be related to the capacity
and potential of the minority entrepreneur development organization. Due regard
should be given to the need to provide appropriate technical assistance to assure the
best opportunity for the enterprise to succeed. Most loans involved here are essen-
tially grants, given the high potential for failure.'50 There seems little reason to hold
two Swords of Damocles over the minority businessman's head. Failure itself should
be enough without the threat of long term debt or the need for recourse to bank-
ruptcy. If there is to be risk, the government is in the best position to assume it.
The regulations should not be there so much to protect the money as to try to
assure that the endeavor has the optimum potential for success. If any measuring
standard is to be used, it should be this one.
"" CDA Letter ioc, supra note 97, at 3.
"140 Id.
"'I7 d. at 6.
' HUD, CDA Letter iod, MC 3 i3 5 .I Supp. 3 (Nov. 1970).
:" The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Model Cities Administration indicated some flexibility by
stating that use of existing corporations was required, "except in unusual cases." Baida, supra note X38.1 0 Because chances for repayment of high risk, inner-city business or personal loans are often
not great, such loans should be viewed as grants. One might wonder about why there was so much
concern expressed in CDA Letter ioc and in the CUOF case over use of grants rather than loans.
FEDERAL FUNDING
CONCLUSION
The referencing of various federal rules and regulations to a series of games
should not prevent recognition of the necessity for appropriate controls over use of
federal funds for minority economic development. Since funds are limited and
their utilization should maximize their effectiveness, recipients should evidence a
reasonable possibility of success in the endeavor to be undertaken. Projects should
be feasible, reasonable documentation of the use of funds should be required, and
technical assistance should be available from both the public and the private sector.
What has evolved for most programs, however, is a set of restrictions which have
become so complex that they do not function as controls but take the appearance of
a succession of games to be imposed upon the intended beneficiaries.
There are understandable reasons for the development of the mass of constraints
which are applied to these programs. Perhaps the primary one stems from the fear
of reaction by Congress when exercising its oversight function, particularly by the
applicable appropriations subcommittees. Presentations to these committees for con-
tinuation of program funding often emphasize criteria insufficiently related to the
purpose for which the legislation was enacted. In its appropriate overseer's role, more-
over, Congress is especially sensitive to misapplication and malfeasance regarding
these funds. Since most programs have had limited success, Congressional expecta-
tions for program effectiveness are not high. Therefore, mismanagement (in terms
of legislative objectives), inefficiency, delay, and ineffectiveness are seemingly only of
secondary concern to Congress. New criteria should be considered when reporting
to Congress-those which have some tangible relationship to program objectives.
Many of these are high-risk programs, a fact which should be dearly and openly
stated to these subcommittees. Success should be measured by the number of oppor-
tunities provided rather than the number of safe loans made. Similarly, an honest
estimate of the lead-time necessary before attempting to measure success should be
the rule, not the exception, in testimony before committees. As thus described, the
problem is one which must be mutually ascribed to Congress and the agency admin-
istrators. In the last analysis, however, the administrators can do much to sway the
congressional attitudes if they take forthright positions concerning necessary changes.
There is a related cause of much of the recourse to gamesmanship in the executive
branch, often denoted as "bureaucratic tendencies." Success is measured by not
making mistakes, by delaying decisions, by recourse to the private sector to make
the determination, and by careful, extended consultation to spread the risk of failure.
Such problems are endemic to bureaucracies generally and are not limited solely
to economic development programs.
The majority of these economic development programs are administered locally.
It is fitting that responsibility for the program should be placed on those persons at
the local level who must operate it. Advice and counseling should be provided, but
success in development activities can be built in only if local administrators and
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minority businessmen are allowed more freedom. In most circumstances, the federal
administrator may delegate responsibility to the recipients of the funds. In effect,
Congress has asked that program administrators force "the horse to drink," whereas,
it should be sufficient if they simply "bring him to the water."
Inherent in the enactment of all of these federal programs is the fact that the private
sector has not been able to revive the depressed economic condition of the inner cities.
There seems little to be gained by forcing private involvement. If there must be
budgetary "tactics," a ioo per cent guarantee along with a small incentive fee should
serve that purpose, while placing the risk with the government, which in the final
analysis is the only body which can and should take it. By acknowledging this
role and proceeding to make -the effort as successful as possible, the government can
obviate, or at least reduce, the elaborate system of games that now exists.
At a minimum, the following list of rather simplified recommendations should
be considered in testing the appropriateness of program requirements:
(i) controls should relate to increasing opportunities for participation and
success, not solely to safeguarding funds;
(2) mistakes should be permitted and assistance in correcting them should be
provided (the government makes many of them);
(3) minority businessmen should be allowed independence and not be forced
to take "partners" unnecessarily;
(4) sufficient funds to permit success should be provided if financial support is
given;
(5) quantum changes should not be expected overnight;
(6) success in administration of programs should be judged on the effectiveness
the program has had in accomplishing statutory objectives;
(7) persons who administer programs should where possible have applicable
experience (perhaps the best use of the SBA SCORE program would be to
advise -the SBA administrators first, and applicants second);
(8) an applicant for financial assistance should be judged on his capacity, not on
the amount of funds he has accumulated to date;
(9) the number of reviews (and resulting delays) should be drastically reduced
by reliance on post-audit procedures;
(io) where the rules must be changed, proper procedures should be used and
the changes applied prospectively;
(ii) flexible use of funds (including pyramiding of support) should be possible;
. and
(12) the government should be the risk-taker of last resort.
